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TITLE: ETHNIC ETHIOPIANS: A CASE STUDY OF DISCRIMINATION OCCURRENCE 
IN ETHIOPIA 
MAJOR PROFESSOR: Dr. Stephen C. Shulman 
This paper presents a new way to understand the occurrence of ethnic discrimination within 
Ethiopia.  I argue that during the time studied, 1950-1992, the more culturally similar five lesser 
ethnic groups were with a dominant ethnic group’s culture the less amount of political 
discrimination they faced from this dominant ethnic group.  Using Minorities at Risk data in 
addition to a cultural similarity scale I have created I argue that ethnic discrimination levels 
within Ethiopia fluctuated over time due to the level of shared cultural traits a certain group had 
at any given point with the dominant Amharan ethnic group culture.  Ultimately I am able to 
show that Amharan culture acted “behind the scenes” as a dominate force within the Ethiopian 
state and such an observation can be used by scholars moving forward to better  understand why 
certain ethnic groups are discriminated against more so than others within Ethiopia.   
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CHAPTER 1-INTRODUCTION 
MUCH OF THE COMPARATIVE WORK ON AFRICAN BASED ETHNIC 
DISCRIMINATION MITIGATION has focused on the formation of ethnically diverse coalition 
governments and their ability to stabilize their respective countries (Asal and Pate 2005; Gurr 
1993, 2000; Wimmer 2002).  Scholars such as Data Barata (2012) and Kidane Mengisteab 
(2008) believe coalition governments will be able to bring the varying ethnic groups of Ethiopia 
together in order to better handle the amounts of discrimination that occurs within Ethiopia along 
ethnic lines.  Other scholars have focused primarily on specific countries such as Ethiopia 
(Ayenew 2002; Barata 2012; Freeman and Pankhurst 2003; Harbeson 2005; Teshome 2008).  
Academics such as Frederick Barth (1998) and Donald Horowitz (1985) have also questioned the 
role that culture plays in African nations and how such cultures can effect ethnic discrimination 
within them.  It is this combined literature of culture formation and ethnic discrimination 
mitigation that this work aims to address specifically with regard to Ethiopia.  In order to address 
these literatures, this work studies levels of political discrimination faced by five lesser ethnic 
groups that was caused by the actions of a dominant ethnic group over a 42 year period within 
Ethiopia.  In order to measure such discrimination I use Minorities at Risk coding from the MAR 
data set.   
One of the main aims of this paper and logic behind my hypothesis presented below is to 
show a causal relationship between cultural similarity and ethnic discrimination.  I argue in the 
pages to follow that upon an ethnic group becoming more culturally similar with another more 
dominant ethnic group this lesser group will face less discrimination as a result.   The logic 
behind such an argument is that upon a lesser group assimilating into a dominant group’s culture 
the dominant will view the lesser as “one of them”.  Upon assimilating in their culture the 
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dominant group no longer views the group as “outsiders” and or a threat. The result of this frame 
shift is that the newly assimilated group will no longer be targeted for discrimination as 
“outsiders” may have been.  
I complement these previous works by addressing the role historical culture had on ethnic 
discrimination mitigation within Ethiopia during the years of 1950-1992.  I take umbrage with 
the notion that coalitional governing can mitigate discrimination within Ethiopia due to the fact 
that these governing bodies are often put together with little attention paid to the cultural 
differences that caused the very groups comprising them to clash.  Thus, according the scholars 
listed above, the best strategy to mitigate ethnic conflict within Ethiopia, coalitional governing, is 
inherently flawed.  This paper will show that upon accounting for the role culture plays on the 
formation of coalitions within Ethiopia this flaw can be corrected.  Ultimately the aim of this 
paper is to answer this question: Do changes in the cultural differences between the ethnic 
groups of Ethiopia lead to changes in the level of political discrimination these groups face?   
 In order to answer this research question this paper will be divided into 5 succinct 
sections and is organized as follows.  The first section will present some key problems that face 
coalition governments forming within the Ethiopian state, key terms/definitions such as ethnic 
group, and briefly present the six ethnic groups of this study.  This will be followed by a section 
explaining the ascendency of Amharan ethnic culture as the dominate culture within Ethiopia 
over its vast history as well as introduce my Cultural Differences hypothesis.  A third section 
will introduce my data, MAR Coding and my Cultural Similarity scale, and methods, historical 
case study, used to test this hypothesis.  This will be followed by a results explanation section 
and a concluding section.  I will also give a brief roadmap of where future research could 
possibly lead. 
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CHAPTER 2-THE ABSENCE OF COALITIONS IN ETHIOPIA 
 The ethnic history of Ethiopia is one as diverse as the people who have who created it.  
This diversity has caused various conflicts and divisions over the roughly 700 years of Ethiopian 
state history.  A study of this history clearly shows us the difficulties such a diversity created 
over the years in the establishment of a stable political authority able to govern Ethiopia.  Even 
in the Ethiopia of today Mengisteab (2008) sets a familiar scene when he states that relations 
between identity politics, democratization, and state building are complex, especially in the cases 
of relatively young countries, such as Ethiopia.  Donald Horowitz points out that “in country 
after country, political parties and trade unions are organized ethnically” (Horowitz 1985, 3).  
Ethiopia is no different in this fashion.  Ethiopia matches many of Horowitz’s original 
criteria needed for the occurrence of ethnic conflict/discrimination.  In addition Horowitz’s 
explanations for such occurrences can also be used to better understand Ethiopia’s ethnic 
discrimination problem.  Horowitz argues that “although international conditions cannot create a 
conflict where one does not exist—for contagion is not the source of ethnic conflict—they can 
create a setting in which ethnic demands seem timely and realistic” (Horowitz 1985, 5).  In 
Ethiopia’s case, such a setting allowed Eritreans to champion the need for autonomy and self-
determination.  Long had they been culturally different from the dominant Amhara in both 
spoken language (Amharic for Ethiopia and Tigrinya/Arabic for Eritrea) religion practiced (vast 
majority Christianity for Ethiopia, roughly 50-50 split between Christianity and Islam in Eritrea).  
There has also been an ongoing territorial dispute between the Amhara and the Eritreans over 
lands which, according to both groups, hold special cultural significance as ‘homelands’.   
Frederick Barth’s work can also be used here for he shows that cultural boundaries persist 
despite a flow of personnel across them. If said differently, “categorical ethnic distinctions do not 
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depend on an absence of mobility, contact and information, but do entail social processes of 
exclusion and incorporation whereby discrete categories are maintained despite changing 
participation and membership in the course of individual life histories” (Barth 1998, 9).  Barth 
(1998) argues that ethnic distinctions do not depend on an absence of social interaction and 
acceptance, but are quite to the contrary often the very foundations on which embracing social 
systems are built.  Barth’s work gives primary emphasis to the fact that ethnic groups are 
categories of ascription and identification by the actors themselves, and thus have the 
characteristic of organizing interaction between people (Barth 1998, 10).  Thus there is a 
connection between Barth and Horowitz.  Barth shows the strength culture has behind group 
behavior while Horowitz shows that one group’s behavior may be in conflict with another 
group’s behavior.  A brief example one can find within Ethiopia of this connection is the 
religious differences between the Amhara and the Eritreans that lead to conflict between the two 
groups.  The religions of both groups were defined by their respective cultures and since these 
religions were different conflict ensued.   
The discrimination problem within Ethiopia needs to be understood on different 
aggregate levels.  Horowitz points out that “control of a state, control of a state, and exemption 
from control by others are among the main goals of ethnic conflict” (Horowitz 1985, 5).  In 
Ethiopia we see this ‘goal’ playing out on these multiple levels.  The dominate Amhara 
controlled the Ethiopian state and while doing so actively promoted and enforced an Amharan 
state within Ethiopia via the enactment of Amharic as the official national language and 
Christianity as the national religion. Thus the ethnic groups within the Ethiopian state who did 
not speak Amharic and or practice Christianity now found themselves as members of cultures 
that were in direct opposition to the newly formed Ethiopian state culture.  Horowitz (85) points 
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out that one ethnic group can learn from another and in so doing becomes similar in their claims 
and aspirations (Horowitz 1985, 6).  This is also true in the case of Ethiopia for the Eritreans, 
seeing the Amharans’ promote their own cultural traits, began to do so as well.  An ethnic group 
with their own language and religion as mentioned above now found themselves not only 
battling the Amhara for territory but for the right to practice their own culture as well.   
 For Horowitz ethnic divisions pose challenges to the cohesion of states and sometimes to 
peaceful relations among states (Horowitz 1985, 12).  In the case of Ethiopia Horowitz helps to 
explain why coalitional governments have not been successful in creating stability within the 
state.  Coalition governments are not simply jig-saw puzzles, in which ethnic groups fit nicely as 
if they were pieces meant for this space all along.  Ethiopia possesses pieces each of which have 
close to 700 years of cultural history affecting how they fit together with each other.  Ethnic 
divisions, clearly shown and explained via Ethiopian history, must be accounted for while 
contemplating how best to solve the ethnic discrimination problem within Ethiopia.  Perhaps the 
most useful concept Horowitz (1985) provides to a discussion such as this is his notion of 
‘ranked ethnic systems’.  As stated above Ethiopian society is highly hierarchical, with the 
dominant Amhara on top.   In such a system political, economic, and social status tend to be 
cumulative, so that members in group B are simultaneously subordinate in each of these ways to 
members of group A (Horowitz 1985, 22).  
 It is important to remember here though that in Ethiopia such a hierarchical structure 
consists of six different ethnic groups; the dominate Amhara as the superordinate group A, to use 
Horowitz’s words, and the other five groups as the subordinate B-F groups.  Thus, just like 
coalitional governments, the ‘ranked structure’ of Ethiopia is highly complex.  In addition the 
cultural history of the Amhara is an example of Horowitz’s notion of the unequal   distribution of 
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worth between superiors and subordinates can also be found within Ethiopian society.  This 
unequal distribution is a direct result of the Kibre Negest, one of the earliest Ethiopic Christian 
writings in history.  This writing ordained the Amhara as the chosen people of Ethiopia, a title 
that allowed to them gain, and hold onto, power for centuries.     
 Also, just as Horowitz suggests, the ‘ranked system’ of Ethiopia finds all six of the ethnic 
groups in question in close proximity with each other.  The Amharas and the Eritreans mentioned 
above are not the only ethnic groups of Ethiopia to claim similar lands as their own, for both the 
Amharan and Tigrean ethnic groups respectively claim Northern Ethiopia as their ‘homeland’.  
Horowitz (85) claims that the Ethiopian Revolution of 1991-1992 might be an example of a 
‘ranked system’ revolution in which subordinates groups overthrow superordinate ones but he 
was not entirely sure that he was.  However I feel that it is an example of such a revolution.  The 
revolution saw groups that were at one time discriminated against by a superordinate dominant 
group and in turn band together to instigate change.  Tigrean and Eritrean forces were able to 
overthrow the dominate Amhara and in turn place themselves as the new superordinate groups 
after1992.  My Cultural Similarity scale, described in greater detail below, will show how these 
“subordinate rankings” changed over time due to how culturally different they were at any given 
time to the superordinate Amhara.    
Scholars such as Andreas Wimmer have shown that minority elites, rather than a majority 
coalition, within a state such as Ethiopia can challenge mobilizing forces to bring about 
modernization and democratization (Wimmer 2002, 96).  If said differently Wimmer (2002) 
shows that individual elites within each separate ethnic group were able to mobilize those under 
them to revolt against those discriminating them.  It is important to note here that Wimmer is 
discussing modernization and democratization and note ethnic discrimination directly; however 
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these topics are connected to one another in the sense that with modernization and 
democratization within a state the amount of discrimination would likely decrease.  Wimmer 
(2002) also argues that the Oromo ethnic group, which will be discussed in greater detail below, 
was able to move Ethiopia toward modernization due to their size and status.  For Wimmer 
(2002) the Oromo’s large population is able to control how much discrimination they face; 
simply put this argument contends that large populations are better equipped to protect 
themselves from other smaller encroaching groups.  Ethiopian history clearly shows the Amhara 
as such a group and this history gives clear examples of how the Amhara actively encroached 
upon and discriminated ethnic groups below them in the societal hierarchy.   
This “large population equals less discrimination” formula does not apply to the Oromo 
people of Ethiopia, however, if one has a better understanding of their ethnic culture.  He is 
correct though in labeling the Oromo as an ethno-nationalist group, or simply put an ethnic group 
with its own state identity, in this case the ‘Oromo State’, calling for more autonomy.  Though 
this “larger population” argument is based upon a sound argument Donald Levine (2000) keenly 
points out that for most of the Oromo’s documented history they have practiced a “turn the other 
cheek” mentality in response to other ethnic groups actively discriminating them.  Levin shows 
that this practice hinders the Oromo’s large bargaining ability which should be used to mitigate 
the discrimination they face, for instead of uniting and using this large population to put political 
pressure on political elites, as Wimmer argues that they did, they instead accept the 
discrimination they face.  As with theories about coalitional governments, yet again we see 
another sound argument unable to explain the Ethiopian case, due to the failure to account for 
ethnic culture.  Ultimately Levin (2000) shows that due to a culture that puts others before 
themselves the Oromo effectively “rolled over” and accepted the discrimination they faced.   
8 
 
Yet again I believe the cultural history and subsequent assimilation processes argument I 
develop can complement these previous works. I argue that by addressing how a certain ethnic 
culture is similar or dissimilar with the dominant Amharan culture one can shed light on why 
federal coalitions comprised of multiple ethnic identities have not yet been able to find prolonged 
stability within the Ethiopian state. Still to this day political mobilization is based on these deep 
seated cultural fissures between the different ethnic groups of Ethiopia.  By addressing the 
origins of these fissures I argue that a better process of finding this needed stability can be 
created.  In addition this argument will show that upon assimilation into Amharan culture, during 
the time studied, the ethnic groups of this study faced lower levels of discrimination.   
 Before one can begin to understand this lack of federal coalitions it is necessary to better 
understand the people that could possibly comprise them.   For the time of my study, according 
to Minorities at Risk (MAR) coding, Ethiopia had six distinct regional ethnic minority groups: 
the Afars, the Amharans, the Eritreans, the Oromo, the Tigrean, and the Somalis.  Within each of 
these groups there are multiple sub groups and families.  For example according to the most 
recent Ethiopian Census data, compiled in 2007, the Oromo ethnic groups has roughly 25 million 
people under the Oromo ethnic title (Galla) which comprises nearly 35% of Ethiopia’s total 
population of nearly 73 million people at that time (2007 Population and Housing Census).  It is 
important to note as well what terms such as ethnic group and coalition government mean.  For 
this study I use Abner Cohen’s definition of ethnic group: “a collectivity of people who share 
some patterns of normative behavior and; form a part of larger population interacting with 
people from other collectivities within the framework of a social system”, a definition that 
African scholars such as Teshome (2008) have used as well (Cohen 1974, ix-x).  If looked at 
differently, Cohen is also defining culture.  Upon using terms such as “normative behavior” that 
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then leads to “patterns of social interaction” the underlying catalyst for such behavior is culture.  
As for coalition government I use my own definition which states as follows: “a governing 
federal state level body comprised of more than three self and state identified unique ethnic 
groups”.  This definition is context specific to Ethiopia and should not be viewed as 
generalizable to all “coalition cases”.  Also it is important to note that the formations of the 
parties that comprise these coalitions are formed on ethnic lines.   
There are plenty of examples of coalition governments around the world being comprised 
of political parties formed solely on like-minded political ideologies.  These political parties are 
aimed at advancing particular views of the Ethiopian state; these views more often than not have 
the particular ethnic group it belongs to at the head of this state.  The reason I choose three or 
more is due to the fact that states which have only two ethnic groups forming governments 
successfully represent all the parties found within the state.  However in countries such as 
Ethiopia that have three or more separate groups it is almost impossible to form a coalition that 
represents all of them; though it would be fair for all groups to be represented at the state level, 
to do so would create too many ethnic barriers to avoid.  For example a hypothetical federal level 
governing body consisting of both Amharan and Eritrean members, two groups who have been at 
consistent odds with each other, would constantly be impeded from making any form of 
executive decisions.  The long lasting cultural differences between these two groups would doom 
any chance for success from the start.  Thus one of the aims of this paper is to highlight these 
differences and show that coalitions where they exit will not be successful.   
 The vast majority of coalition governments created in Ethiopian history have been post 
1991.  This was due to the overthrow of the second Derg regime, discussed in greater detail 
below, that allowed for the different ethnic groups to ascend to state level power in accordance 
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with their respective levels of assimilation into Amharan culture.  The reason I am still 
discussing coalition governments during my time of study (1950-1992) is for two reasons: 1) the 
governments in power during those years, though strictly comprised of one ethnic group, had to 
coexist with either colonial rulers or Soviet sponsors; such an arrangement created an 
environment in which rival ethnic groups were constantly vying for power, a hostile environment 
that could have been pacified by successful coalitions and 2) to show that this 42 years of 
cultural history being studied still effects coalition forming in present day Ethiopia.   
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CHAPTER 3-THE ASCENDENCY OF AMHARAN CULTURE 
 One of the most important aspects of Ethiopian history is the varying cultural paths each 
of the six ethnic groups discussed in this study took over their histories.  Dating back to 500 B.C. 
we can see that the Amhara and Tigrean people are very culturally similar but due to language 
differences have a long history of political rivalry within the empire (Gurr 1993, 277-278). These 
Amhara are unique among black African ethno-political groups, the political power seeking form 
of an ethno-nationalist group, in recognizing the centrality of assimilation rather than common 
descent in their formation and growth.  If said differently the Amhara recognized early on that 
they could grow their ethnic group by actively assimilating, sometimes violently, other people 
into the Amharan family.  Scholars such as Data Barata (2012) and Donald Levin (2000) both 
point out that Amharic is the formal language of business and government in Ethiopia today.  In 
addition Amharic greeting and social practices are the informal behavior patterns of modern 
Ethiopian society.  This majority use of Amharan cultural traits in Ethiopian society took 
centuries to cultivate.  Over said centuries those ethnic groups who did not practice these 
majority traits faced discrimination from those who did.  Thus non-Amharic peoples need to 
assimilate and adopt accordingly in order to mitigate this discrimination (Barata 2012, 6).  This 
history of discrimination based upon how similar or dissimilar one ethnic group is with the 
dominant Amhara leads me to this hypothesis: 
Cultural Differences Hypothesis- The more culturally different a particular ethnic group is to 
Amharan culture the more discrimination over the time studied they will face from the Amharan 
The logic behind this hypothesis, as mentioned above, is that cultural differences act as a 
catalyst behind a dominant group, like the Amhara, choosing to discriminate against a lesser 
ethnic group.  When identified as “outsiders” due to the lack of shared cultural traits with the 
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Amhara the lesser groups of Ethiopia became targets of political discrimination by the Amhara.  
Thus this hypothesis will be accepted in the cases to follow if an ethnic group’s amount of 
political discrimination is high and or increasing during the time studied while at the same time 
have a low and or decreasing amount of shared cultural traits with the Amhara.   In contrast this 
hypothesis will be rejected if an ethnic group’s amount of political discrimination fluctuates 
regardless of how many shared cultural traits they have with the Amhara.   
Rather than have strict definitions of what it “means” to be Amharan these people over 
time had far more fluid identity definitions.  This allowed them to not only assimilate other 
ethnic groups but also to more easily incorporate them into the Amhara “family” of sorts.  Over 
these next few pages it is paramount that the history of Amharan cultural ascendency be 
explained, for as mentioned above this 700 years of history affects ethnic discrimination 
occurrences today.  The long lasting cultural ties/arrangements, or lack thereof, between the 
people of Ethiopia and the dominant Amhara explained below will show, no matter how old, can 
cause animosity between groups even today.   
Perhaps the greatest examples of this Amhara cultural expansion are given to us by 
Donald Levin (2000) in his book Greater Ethiopia discussing the history of what he calls 
“Greater Ethiopia”.  In his work Levin points out that various Amharan tribal based practices 
spread over time to other tribes.  Practices such as the use of insignias to symbolize authority 
within society, based off of the Royal Amhara drum which was sounded when Amharan-Tigrean 
monarchs left their camps or palaces to go to war, to church, or simply to journey (Levin 57).  In 
order to better understand the evolution of the Ethiopian state Levin argues that the image of 
Ethiopia as a Judeo-Christian Semitic core surrounded by various disparate African tribes must 
be replaced by an image which acknowledges that the peoples of Greater Ethiopia have long 
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shared many features of a deeply rooted cultural complex.  A cultural complex, this paper argues, 
with Amharan culture as the base.  Levin champions such a claim when he credits the Amhara 
for revitalizing the effort to provide a political and cultural center in Greater Ethiopia (Levin 72).   
However the Amharan cannot claim this revitalization all to themselves.  The Tigreans 
who have long been viewed as the “native people” of Ethiopia deserve credit as well.  Levin 
(2000) points out that all of the triumphs of the Amharan kings of old were made possible by the 
Tigreans for it was Tigrean elders in the 14th century who wrote the Kibre Negest, the foremost 
creation of Ethiopic literature, which gave the Amhara their “kingly” rights (Levin 109).  This 
literary work laid the foundation for Amharan rule long before the Amhara people were strong 
enough to do so.  Levin argues that this work provided some of the core symbolism that served 
to fashion, inspire, and legitimate the project of creating an Amhara Imperium (Levin 112).  The 
Amharan never forgot this foundation and because of this throughout most of Ethiopia’s history 
the two ethnic groups have been identified as the Amhara-Tigrean by other ethnic groups.  It was 
not until the time studied here that the two groups began to clash consistently, a clash which had 
its climax in 1991 when a Tigrean led revolutionary force overthrew an Amharan regime.   
During the second half of the 19th century the Amhara started to expand their lands and 
culture and in doing so absorbed other minority groups.  Levin paints a clear picture of the 
expansion strategy the Amhara used stating that expansion was not merely done by force but that 
such subjugation was accompanied, and often preceded, by a diffusion of Amhara cultural 
influence in such spheres as language, religion, moral values, and political style (Levin 74). 
Levin, like Barata (2012), gives a strong example of this diffusion by showing that Amharic 
language became the lingua franca of all elites, regardless of tribal origin, in all spheres of 
Amharan influence.  It is this diffusion of culture that this work aims to shed light on.  This 
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diffusion is one step however, for upon Amharan culture being diffused the other ethnic groups 
in question still had to choose to either accept/reproduce or deny/reject it as their own.  Said 
differently once an ethnic group, say the Oromo for example, learned how to speak Amharic and 
or practice Christianity it was then up to them whether or not to practice these traits.   
One such minority group the Amhara expansion met was the highly fragmented 
collection of Muslim farmers named the Oromo.  Mostly centered in the capital city region 
(Addis Ababa), the historical heart of Amharan lands, the Oromo over the years have become 
highly assimilated into Amhara culture while Oromo outside of the capital city region stayed in 
conflict with the Amharas to varying degrees (Gurr 1993, 278).  Levin shows that within their 
own culture the Oromo are orientated toward friendly association with other ethnics.  As 
mentioned above their culture places other people above themselves.  This was partnered with a 
continual decline in cultural practices within Oromo society that ultimately lead to traditional 
Oromo behaviors becoming less and less practiced by new generations of Oromo(Levin 161).  
Thus the eventual assimilation into the Amharan culture is not surprising.  Levin concludes that 
this combination of non-confrontational behavior and a dyeing culture helps to explain the 
Oromo’s capacity to join with Amharan-Tigreans at the national level.  This conclusion is 
supported by the MAR data and my similarity scale I present below.   
The Amharan expansion also created a negative consequence post 1930’s with the 
acquisition of Eritrea which caused an immediate clash between Amhara culture and Eritrean 
culture.  The Amhara themselves openly rejected Eritrean nationalism, mostly due to the Amhara 
thinking they possessed the “true Ethiopian nationalism”, and because of this assimilation of any 
sort between the two groups became futile. From the onset of their encounters the Amharans and 
Eritreans clashed in about every aspect of society ranging from spoken language to practiced 
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religion.  It is because of this lack of “cultural bridges” that during the entire length of this study 
the Eritreans faced the highest consistent level of political discrimination of all the groups 
studied.  These “cultural bridges” can come in the form of a shared language, religion, and 
formal/informal social practices to name a few things that could be traits of a culture.  If we put 
Amharan and Eritrean culture side by side we find very few similarities between them; 
Christianity for the Amharan vs Islam for the Eritreans and the difference in language are just 
two of the key differences between them.  This lack of cultural similarity between these two 
groups helps to explain the animosity found between them.  Although not as populous as the 
Eritreans another “minority at risk” within the Eritrea region are the Afars who due to culture 
differences with the Amharans, like the Eritreans, were given regional autonomy post 1975. In 
doing such the Afars saw their political discrimination levels drop after this partition of sorts.   
Amhara assimilation of the Oromo in the Shoa region and elsewhere represents an 
expansion of “primordial” identity on a scale that far exceeds the expansion that has occurred in 
the likes of Zambia and Kenya, both of which have similar numbers of Oromo ethnics. The 
Tigreans however, although the “native people” of Ethiopia like the Amhara, now found 
themselves split between Ethiopian-Eritrean lands, thus making unified Tigrean ethno-
nationalism creation difficult (Gurr 1993, 279).  Freeman and Pankhurst (2003) second this 
“native people” label by stating that in most of the villages and tribal gatherings they studied 
people of Amharan and Tigrean ancestry were treated by those who were not Amharan-Tigrean 
like “gods”.  Although they were treated like “gods”, this geographical division made Tigrean 
unification against the Amhara in the later portions of the time studied here nearly impossible.  
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CHAPTER 4-CHALLENGES TO AMHARAN DOMINANCE 
The mass mobilization for power we saw during the 42 year period in Ethiopia I study in 
this paper by almost all ethnic groups finds its roots in the Eritrean mobilization in the 1960’s.  
This movement then spread to Tigrean, Oromo and Somali groups later on.  Mobilization 
continued into both the Haile Selassie and Mengistu Haile Mariam Communists regimes.  By 
banning public political parties and political demonstrations these ardently repressive regimes 
created an oppositional “united minority front” based out of Addis Ababa University which 
called for the removal of both regimes (Teshome 7).   
It is important to note here that both of these regimes, as well as many before and after it, 
were Amharan based.  Because of this we see the first glimpse of Amhara culture not only being 
practiced by the royal family but also by lesser groups rallying under it to avoid persecution.  
This persecution led to the creation of two power players in Ethiopian politics post 1960, the 
Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) and the Tigrean People’s Liberation Front (TPLF).  The ELF is 
worth mentioning in greater detail due to the history Eritrea had within Ethiopia prior to 1960.  
Both during the colonial reign of the British as well as the Soviet Union Eritrea, due to its access 
to major water ways, acted as a key staging point for both colonizers.  As a result of this the 
Eritrean region became more advanced than the other Ethiopian regions.  This foothold on 
advancement caused two key issues: 1) the people of Eritrea grew tired of being “ruled” by 
Amharans and thus started to form radical independence movements like ELF and 2) the rest of 
Ethiopia tried to impede Eritrean modernization (Gurr 1993, 280).  Both of these consequences 
came to a spearhead in 1991 when both the EPLF (later form of ELF) and the TPLF succeeded in 
overthrowing the Ethiopian Amharan communist regime. 
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Though this paper is not one focused entirely on Ethiopian history as the above pages 
may suggest all of the history laid out above is a vital component of this paper.  A state that has 
been in existence for as long as Ethiopia has clearly possess a plethora of events that shaped the 
Ethiopia of today, a state that is still dictated by hundreds of years of history.  Though it may be 
difficult to comprehend how conflicts between cultures of so long ago can still cause problems 
today I assure you that that is the case.   
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CHAPTER 5-DATA AND METHODS 
In order to test my hypothesis I use a case study analysis methodology.  By focusing on 
the individual histories of each of the six ethnic groups found in this study I am able to provide a 
causal link between the data sets explained below.  The combination of qualitative case study 
analysis with that of quantitative statistical analysis will create an encompassed and 
methodologically sound answer to my Cultural Differences Hypothesis.   
The first dataset that I use is the Minorities at Risk (MAR) Discrimination Dataset.  This 
dataset was started by Ted Robert Gurr in 1986 to examine and document the status of ethnic and 
religious minority groups in countries from all over the world, since 1946 (Asal and Pate 2005, 
28).  Ethnic identity groups often compete with other political organizations, and especially the 
central state, for the loyalty and support of group members.  It is because of this that theories 
have argued that political and economic discrimination in relations between ruling elites and 
constituent groups generates strong grievances and creates powerful incentives that drive ethnic 
conflict and, possibly, leads groups to armed conflict.  The MAR project has assigned annual 
political discrimination codes for 337 different ethnic groups in 124 different countries since 
1950.   
The MAR project focuses specifically on ethno-political groups: non-state communal 
groups that have “political significance” in the contemporary world because of their status and 
political actions. One aspect of political significance is related to the group’s size. For a group to 
be included in the MAR project, it must have a population of at least 100,000 or account for at 
least one percent of the country’s total population.  A second aspect concerns the distinct quality 
of a group’s relationship with state authorities. This aspect of political significance is determined 
by the following two criteria:1) the group collectively suffers, or benefits from, systematic 
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discriminatory treatment vis-à-vis other groups in a society; and, 2) the group is the basis for 
political mobilization and collective action in defense or promotion of its self-defined interests 
(Asal and Pate 29).  The MAR project believes — by people who share some such traits and by 
those with whom they interact — that the traits such as race and ethnicity set them apart from 
others in ways that justify their separate treatment and status.  This belief fits directly into my 
research here for two keys reasons: 1) it can easily be applied to all five of the ethnic groups 
discriminated against by the Amhara found in this study and 2) both the MAR dataset and this 
paper hold culture as an important and dominate force.  
The MAR project has coded group discrimination yearly using a five-point scale (Asal 
and Pate 30).  MAR defines each numerical value for political discrimination as follows: 0= “No 
Discrimination”- Groups facing no political discrimination or not suffering from substantial 
under-representation due to past discrimination; 1= “Remedial Discrimination”- Groups that are 
under-represented (at the federal level) because of past discrimination which is currently 
addressed by governmental remedial policies; 2= “Historical Discrimination”- Groups that are 
now under-represented because of past political discrimination or disadvantages but whose status 
is not being addressed by governmental remedial policies; 3= “Societal Discrimination” -Groups 
that currently suffer from substantial under-representation due to prevailing social practice by 
dominant groups and to which formal public policies toward the group are neutral or, if positive, 
inadequate to offset discriminatory policies; 4= “Governmental Discrimination” - Public policies 
substantially restrict the group’s political participation or group members (other than those 
directly engaged in anti-regime activism) are subject to recurring repression that limits group 
political mobilization (Asal and Pate 30).  In regards to Ethiopia it is important to note that 
since the years of 1991 and 1992 were years of constant revolution within Ethiopia MAR 
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decided to code all groups found within the state as having 0 levels of political 
discrimination.  Hence all of the political discrimination graphs presented below will have 
scores of 0 for these years.   
Over the course of the MAR project (1950-2003) the total population of all of the 
minorities reported in MAR ranged from 12.5 to 15% of the world’s population.  With the MAR 
project focusing on ethnic and religious minorities within states the project provides a relatively 
rare opportunity to examine and compare political dynamics at the group level of analysis (Asal 
and Pate 33).  Although this paper only looks at the Ethiopian state specifically my subsequent 
work will look at various ethnic groups from different regions at the same time.  Thus the MAR 
dataset will allow me to study all of these groups under one common coding. This will allow me 
to better account for various societal/cultural aspects that may help explain why one group in a 
certain region is discriminated against without pause while another group in a different region is 
not. 
Cultural Similarity Scale 
This similarity scale codes how culturally similar the five lesser ethnic groups of Ethiopia 
are with the dominant Amharan ethnic group on a year by year basis during the years of 1950-
1992.  This scale ranges from a score of 0, very culturally different, to 4, very culturally similar, 
with one point increments between said scores.  The increase or decrease of these scores is 
dependent upon how many cultural traits the particular group has in common with the Amharan 
group.   The traits that will be used to determine these scores are as follows: 1) shared language 
with the Amhara; 2) same religion practiced as the Amhara; 3) claims to the same “cultural 
homelands” and 4) close geographical proximity with the Amhara.   
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In order for a group to “share a language” with the Amharan the majority of that group 
will have to speak the Amharan language of Amharic.  All of the groups found with in this study 
have their own respective languages, but in order to be coded as having this similar trait with the 
Amhara they will have to speak Amharic instead of their own language.  These lesser groups 
during the time studied spoke Amharic in both professional and personal settings.  A 
professional setting would be any interaction that takes place between the Amharan and 
members of one of the lesser groups in a work and or government setting.  A personal setting 
would be any interaction that takes place either at an individual’s home or at a casual social 
gathering.  For example the Oromo located in central Ethiopia spoke Amharic in a professional 
setting while selling their agricultural produce to Amharan business men while at the same time 
the Tigreans spoke Amharic in their own homes with their Amharan relatives.  It is important to 
note however that upon the breakdown of Amharan-Tigrean relations, discussed in greater detail 
below, the amount of Tigreans who spoke Amharic decreased and in turn started to speak their 
own language of Tigrinya instead.   
 In order for a group to be coded as “practicing the same religion” as the Amharan a 
majority of that lesser group will need to practice the Amhara’s religion of Christianity.  For 
almost the entirety of Amharan and Tigrean history they have practiced Christianity together and 
it was not until late in this study that this similarity between them changed.  The Eritreans 
however never practiced Christianity and instead practiced Islam.  Between these two extremes 
is the Oromo ethnic group who during the time studied had a majority of its members shift from 
Islam to Christianity.  Upon this shift the Oromo were able to be given this code.  Thus by 
studying each group’s individual history I’ll be able to see if they practiced Christianity along 
with the Amharan, if so they will coded as such. 
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A “cultural homeland” is a locale that holds a strong cultural significance to a majority of 
a particular ethnic group. It is one thing to claim an area as a “territorial homeland”, or simply 
where one’s group geographically comes from.  It is another practice entirely, however, to view 
an area as a place where what it means to be, say, Amharan comes from.  For example the north 
eastern part of Ethiopia is a region that both the Amharan-Tigrean and the Eritreans claim as the 
home of their respective cultures.  This region for the Amharan-Tigrean is where the Kibre 
Negest was written, thus it was the birth place of the idea that the Amharan were the “chosen” 
people” of Ethiopia.  Thus this region may be geographically where the Amharan-Tigrean 
originated from but more importantly, as this paper argues, it is where the cultural basis of 
Amharan-Tigrean existence was born.  For the Eritreans this area holds the same significance 
because it was the birth of many of their Muslim prophets that they still hold in high regard 
today.  Yet again it is paramount to see the distinction between simply viewing this area as a 
place on a map where the Eritreans originated to instead viewing as the place where what it 
meant to be an Eritrean came from.  It is because of this distinction and emphasis on culture that 
I feel this “cultural homeland” similarity measurement is warranted.   
Centuries ago this area, according to the groups just mentioned, is where they believe 
their people “came to be”.  Granted all of these groups over the years have migrated away from 
this area, the Amharas and Tigreans moved south to central Ethiopia while the Eritreans moved 
further north east to what is now Eritrea, but it is still held in high regard by all of these groups.  
This region in Ethiopia for the Amharan-Tigrean and Eritreans holds a similar significance to, 
say, Jerusalem for Christians and Mecca for Muslims respectively. Thus it should be no surprise 
that this area was highly contested between the groups during the time of this study.  
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For this study ethnic groups will be deemed to be in “close proximity” with each other if 
the cities/towns/villages of Ethiopia happen to have a majority of its inhabitants belonging to 
certain ethnic groups.  For example the Oromo ethnic group has a majority its 25 million people 
living in central Ethiopia around the capital city of Addis Ababa.  At the same time the majority 
of the Amharan ethnic group also live in this area.  Thus the Oromo will be coded as being in 
“close proximity” with the Amhara for as long as this arrangement continues.  In contrast to this 
the majority of the Somali ethnic group lives in the south western portion of Ethiopia far away 
from the majority of Amharas living around Addis Ababa.  Because of this arrangement the 
Somali will not be coded as being in “close proximity” with the Amhara.  The histories of each 
of the lesser groups in this study paint a clear of enough picture of where a majority of their 
members are located in regards to where a majority of the dominant Amhara are located.   
The close proximity trait, though not culturally based like the other three are, is vital for 
my argument to remain sound.  Social scientists such as Emile Durkheim (1893) and Max Weber 
(1946) have shown that in order for cultural traits to truly pass from person to person in society, 
these persons must be in close proximity with one another. Thus it would have been much 
harder, for example, for the Amharic language to be learned and subsequently practiced by the 
Oromo, as it would be had the Oromo been located far away in, say, southern Ethiopia.  
However, as stated above, the Oromo were located at the heart of Amharan lands in central 
Ethiopia, thus allowing for Amharan cultural traits to be assimilated rather easily.   Ultimately all 
of these traits equally play into the logic behind the casual relationship between cultural 
similarity and discrimination this paper aims to address.  Simply put the more of the traits above 
that a groups is coded as having, my argument expects such a group to face a low amount of 
discrimination.   
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For each year of the time specified above the five lesser ethnic groups will be given a 
score that matches how many of the traits just listed they share with the Amhara.  (An appendix 
at the end of this paper is provided to show which traits were shared in any given year for each 
group.)  Thus, for example, if the Tigrean ethnic group in the year 1965 held all of these traits 
with the Amhara they would be given a cultural similarity scale of 4 for that year.  This coding 
scheme will be repeated for every year during the time specified.  It is also important to note here 
these five groups will only be matched against the Amhara and not each other.  This is due to the 
Amharan culture being the only dominant culture of Ethiopia during the time studied here.    
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CHAPTER 6-RESULTS 
Throughout almost the entire history of Ethiopia the Amharan ethnic group has been the 
dominant ethnic group in regards to holding federal level power.  The other five groups listed 
above over the years have had varying degrees of hostile relations with the Amhara.  It has been 
the aim of this paper to show that this variation of hostile relations can be explained by the causal 
relationship between cultural similarity and ethnic discrimination.  In analyzing the results 
presented below I have found in common with some, but not all, of five lesser groups is that the 
more culturally similar they have been throughout the years with the dominant Amharan culture 
the less discrimination that group has faced from the Amhara.  In contrast the more culturally 
different one of these five groups has been with the Amhara the more discrimination they have 
faced from the Amhara over the years.  Such a finding is the corner stone of my cultural 
similarity hypothesis.   
Ethiopia’s history is full of examples that clearly show these lesser ethnic groups actively 
sharing or actively rejecting traits of Amharan culture.  One brief example of an ethnic group 
actively sharing Amhara culture is the Oromo adopting Amharic as their official language of 
business and social interactions (day-to-day interactions).  Both of the data sets explained above 
show that upon this adoption and subsequent continual usage Oromo-Amhara relations 
improved.  In contrast to this outcome Ethiopian history also shows that upon actively rejecting 
to practice traits of Amharan culture and via the advocating of their own language (mostly 
Arabic) and religion (split between Christianity and Islam) Eritrean discrimination levels, 
according to MAR, were at peak levels.  Thus by being highly culturally different than that of the 
Amharas, Eritreans were discriminated by the Amhara more than the other lesser ethnic groups.   
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The graphs presented below show the changes in discrimination levels for each of the 
groups via MAR coding during the 42 years of this study.   I was pleased to find that the graphs 
for each group accurately represented the amount of cultural similarities each group had with 
Amharan culture over the time studied.  Each of the lesser groups will have two graphs; one 
documenting levels of political discrimination and a final graph that depicts that groups cultural 
similarity scores.  The Amharan will only have a political discrimination graph to provide a 
quantitative picture of their dominance over Ethiopian society during the time studied.  It is 
important to note here that as these graphs are introduced, in order for my argument to be found 
correct, the discrimination and similarity graphs will be trending in opposite directions.  Said 
differently if one group’s discrimination graph has increasing levels over the years studied it is to 
be expected that that groups similarity scores should be low and or decreasing.  The opposite 
effect, decreasing discrimination levels and increasing (and or) high similarity scores, should be 
expected as well. These graphs are as follows: 
AMHARA 
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FIGURE 1 
 
As we can see the Amhara faced no political discrimination during the time period 
studied.  As the literature above shows the Amhara throughout Ethiopian history have held the 
title of “Ethiopia’s chosen people”.  This is rather surprising seeing how that at any point in 
Ethiopian history the Amhara never held a majority in regards to population (Harbeson 3).  
During the specific years of this study the Amharan people were represented by four separate 
“Royal Regimes” that were only subservient to colonial and USSR sponsored rulers.  It is 
important to note here a key strategy these Amhara royal regimes started to use in the 1960’s.  
This strategy placed Amhara culture in the “back seat” of sorts and in its place the regimes 
started to promote a unified Ethiopian national identity.  One would think then that with the 
creation of an Ethiopian culture Amhara ethno-nationalist culture would start to lose its 
dominance in day-to-day Ethiopian interactions.  This was not the case however for the 
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Ethiopian culture was just that, the culture of a new nation-state while Amhara culture remained 
atop the regional and individual-to-individual interactions.  Thus when one was discussing state 
to state topics Ethiopian national culture was used but for everything else taking place within 
Ethiopia Amhara culture still remained dominant (Gurr 1993, 2000). Ultimately we can see that 
the combination of being not only the cultural chosen elite, dating back to the Kibre Negest, but 
the favored ethnic group by colonial leaders allowed the Amhara to dominate Ethiopian society.  
AFARS 
FIGURE 2 
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FIGURE 3 
 
The Afar people are the second minority group, the Eritreans being the other, primarily 
located within Eritrea.  The graph shows that from 1950-1975 the Afars took the brunt of 
discrimination from not only the Ethiopian government but the more dominant Eritreans as well.  
The key drops in their political discrimination level post 1975 can be explained by two events.  
The first is the Amharan dominated government (Derg regime) seeing that the Afars were 
becoming more Eritrean like than like themselves resulting in more regional autonomy for the 
Afars.  This autonomy is the reason the similarity score dropped from 1 to 0 since the two groups 
were no longer in “close proximity” with each other.  This new autonomy caused the Afars to 
suffer from “Societal Discrimination”, coded level 3 by MAR, due to their subservience to the 
Eritreans within their region instead of Ethiopian sanctioned governmental based discrimination 
(level 4).  However the drop in both the Afars similarity scores and political discrimination 
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scores throughout the time studied shows that something other than my cultural similarity 
hypothesis is needed to explain these changes and because of this result I have to reject my 
hypothesis for this case.   
TIGREAN 
FIGURE 4 
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FIGURE 5 
 
 
The Tigrean people, like the Amhara, were the native people of Ethiopia.  Though 
representing less than 10% of the Ethiopian population the Tigrean people were arguably the 
most “vocal” with their societal complaints through public protests.  The Tigreans never 
acquiring the advanced agricultural skills that the Oromo and Somali had and due to their 
consistent in fighting, found them constantly weaker than the Amharan royal regimes.  It is 
important to remember here how culturally similar the Amharans and Tigreans were throughout 
most of Ethiopian history.  For a vast majority of this history the Amharans saw the Tigreans as 
“family”.   Throughout almost the entirety of the history covered in this paper the Tigrean people 
spoke Amharic instead of their own Tigrean language, practiced Christianity and claimed 
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northern Ethiopia as a shared “homeland” with the Amharan.  However upon the rise of the first 
Derg Regime and carrying into the second regime starting in the 1970’s Amharic rulers began to, 
for unknown reasons, reject the established historical importance of the Tigreans within 
Ethiopian society.  No longer were they given credit for ordaining the Amhara and giving them 
their “kingly power”.   
As a result of this Tigrean elites began to rebel against their once Amharan brethren and 
the TPLF was formed.  The Tigreans refused to speak Amharic, reverted back to their own 
version of Ethiopic Christianity, and advocated that the “cultural homelands” of the north had 
been theirs all along.  Thus as their similarity graph above indicates in just a few short years the 
Tigreans went from sharing all of the traits of Amharan culture to now, upon the formation of the 
TPLF, only finding themselves in “close proximity” with the Amhara.  These changes eventually 
led the Tigrean people too publicly and violently clash with the second Amharan Derg regime.  
This would explain their political discrimination level increasing from 0-4 starting in 1974 when 
the second Amharan Derg regime formally took power.  This level of political discrimination 
continued until the TPLF and the EPLF successfully overthrew the regime in 1991, hence their 
drop back to 0 post revolution (Gurr 1993, 285).  As mentioned above we see that as the amount 
of cultural similarities decreased between the Amharan and Tigrean peoples the amount of 
discrimination the Tigreans’ faced increased.  Thus the corresponding graphs above depict this 
interaction quite nicely and I can accept my hypothesis for this case.   
ERITREANS 
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FIGURE 6 
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FIGURE 7 
 
The Eritreans act as the prime example of a group who never possessed enough cultural 
similarities with Amhara culture to mitigate their discrimination levels.  As we can see from the 
start of the time studied the Eritreans were politically discriminated without pause.  The literature 
explained above clearly shows that during both colonial rule periods in Ethiopian history Eritrea 
acted as one of the key staging points to control the other Ethiopian regions and as stated above 
this caused increased hostility between the Eritreans and the other five main ethnic groups.  The 
consistently high political discrimination articulates the amount of contempt the other regional 
governments had for Eritrea.  These constantly high levels are explained by my cultural 
similarity argument for the similarity score of 1 represents that the Amhara and Eritreans only 
claimed the same “cultural homelands”.  This shared trait actually led to more discrimination 
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rather than less because it caused a violent confrontation between the Amharas and Eritreans 
over who laid claim to this area.     
Differences in language, Arabic vs Amharic, and practiced religion, Islam vs Christianity 
help to explain my argument as well.  Thus it is important to note that by not being in “close 
proximity” with the Amhara, the subsequent likelihood of Eritreans learning Amharic and 
practicing Christianity is low.  Such a conclusion is supported by the logic of Durkheim and 
Weber presented above.  Ultimately when you combine all of the history listed above with the 
actions of ELF and the subsequent EPLF against the second Amharan Derg regime we can see 
why this discrimination level remained at the maximum value.  However, like the Tigreans, once 
the Derg regime was overthrown in 1991 Eritrean discrimination levels dropped to zero.  This 
violent history between the Amhara and Eritreans when combined with the lack of shared 
cultural traits between them allows me to accept my hypothesis for this case.   
SOMALI 
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FIGURE 8 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0
1
2
3
4
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990
A: Political Discrimination for Somalis
P
o
lit
ic
a
l 
D
is
c
ri
m
in
a
ti
o
n
 L
e
v
e
l
YEAR
Graphs by NUMCODE
37 
 
FIGURE 9 
 
The Somali people have an Ethiopian history similar to the Oromo people.  Their 
maximum political discrimination from 1950-1975 unfortunately can be explained by non-
Ethiopian based radicals in neighboring Somalia trying to acquire new tribal territories.  As a 
result the Somali people based in Ethiopia were caught in an “anti-Somali” rhetoric and unfairly 
politically persecuted.  Because most of the Somali people living in the far southern part of 
Ethiopia they were never able to live in close proximity with the Amharas the diffusion of 
Amharan cultural traits was difficult to achieve.  The Somali never formally practiced 
Christianity and did not claim northern Ethiopia as their “homeland”.  The only trait that they did 
share was the sharing of Amharic language starting in the 1970’s in the hopes such a practice 
would allow them to better produce and sell their crops and harvest.  However they began to 
share this trait after the amount of discrimination the Somali faced had already decreased from 4 
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to 3, thus my hypothesis does not explain this drop discrimination.  Since discrimination lessened 
before similarity increased I have to reject my hypothesis for this case.  (It is still important to 
note that 1991-1992 was coded by MAR as 0 due to the revolution taking place within the state, 
thus my similarity scale and hypothesis cannot be applied to these years.)  
OROMO 
FIGURE 10 
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FIGURE 11 
 
The Oromo people are the best example of how shared cultural traits can positively affect 
an ethnic group within Ethiopia.  As already stated the Oromo not only represent the single 
largest ethnic group within Ethiopia but also produce two of the most valuable commodities; 
food and grain seed.  This crop production can be directly associated to both of the drops in 
political discrimination in 1975 and 1985 respectively shown in the graph.  Upon the Ethiopian 
government passing strict crop production laws starting in the early 1970’s those who were 
responsible for such production, mainly the Oromo, began to be angered by such persecution.  
With the official overthrow of the monarch in 1975 by what would eventually become the 
second Derg Regime strong peasant (Oromo farmers) support for the Derg rapidly expanded, via 
the Oromo using Amharic as their official language, and the Oromo were treated more fairly as a 
result.  Moving ahead to 1985 the ending of the Derg revolution and the successful 
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implementation of a full Derg Regime the Oromo were yet again awarded for their loyalty thus 
explaining the second drop in discrimination.  My cultural similarity argument also explains the 
drop in the discrimination levels.  Throughout the Derg revolution from 1975-1985 the Oromo 
actively spoke Amharic, actively practiced Christianity, and continually found themselves in 
direct contact with the Amharan people.  Thus the continual sharing of Amharan cultural traits is 
directly correlated with the drop in Oromo political discrimination levels as their political 
discrimination graph above shows and I can accept my hypothesis for this case.   
To me it is not a coincidence that the original ethnic group the Amhara assimilated has 
had the most consistent discrimination mitigation of all the other five groups.  When you 
combine this with their long standing “turn the other cheek” history with the Amhara their less 
political discrimination over time as the graph shows is not surprising.  Ultimately all of the 
graphs just presented, the Eritrean and Oromo especially, confirm my hypothesis that changes in 
the amount of cultural similarities between the dominant Amharan and the lesser ethnic groups 
of Ethiopia does change the amount of political discrimination these lesser groups face.   
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CHAPTER 7-CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
Via the use of the MAR dataset and my Cultural Similarity Scale I have successfully 
shown that the cultural histories of the ethnic groups of Ethiopia do affect discrimination 
occurrences within the Ethiopian state.  My results show that changes in the amount of cultural 
similarities, either positively or negatively, did affect discrimination levels for three of the five 
lesser ethnic groups I study.  Also the graphs show that all of the ethnic groups in this study 
faced equal amounts of political discrimination at various points in time.  Thus since no one 
group other than the Amhara had consistently low levels of discrimination I am justified in 
challenging the elite minority argument championed by scholars such as Wimmer (2002).  
Wimmer argued that the Oromo were able to mitigate the level of political discrimination they 
faced due to their large population; however as the MAR coding above shows they were 
discriminated against just as much as the other lesser groups were.  This study also shows that 
groups which actively shared tenants of Amhara culture, like the Oromo, faced lower levels of 
discrimination over time.  On the opposite side of these results however groups such as the 
Eritreans and the Tigreans during the Derg regime faced higher levels of discrimination as a 
consequence of not sharing Amharan cultural tenants. 
This study is not without flaws however. The prime one being that this is a single case 
study attempting to challenge previously accepted generalizable theories.  Though such a task is 
possible I feel that future versions of this study need to incorporate more than just one country as 
I have done.  With this being said however I do feel that my general argument that cultural 
similarities when coded along the same line of the MAR dataset and ultimately compared to one 
another future research can be aided by such a practice. By applying this model to other ethnic 
groups around the world scholars will hopefully be able to see whether or not certain societal 
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contexts lead to different levels of shared cultural tenants and subsequent lower or higher levels 
of ethnic discrimination.   
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Shared Traits by Year and Group 
Group Year Score   Traits Shared 
Afars 1950 1 proximity 
Afars 1951 1 proximity 
Afars 1952 1 proximity 
Afars 1953 1 proximity 
Afars 1954 1 proximity 
Afars 1955 1 proximity 
Afars 1956 1 proximity 
Afars 1957 1 proximity 
Afars 1958 1 proximity 
Afars 1959 1 proximity 
Afars 1960 1 proximity 
Afars 1961 1 proximity 
Afars 1962 1 proximity 
Afars 1963 1 proximity 
Afars 1964 1 proximity 
Afars 1965 1 proximity 
Afars 1966 1 proximity 
Afars 1967 1 proximity 
Afars 1968 1 proximity 
Afars 1969 1 proximity 
Afars 1970 1 proximity 
Afars 1971 1 proximity 
Afars 1972 1 proximity 
Afars 1973 1 proximity 
Afars 1974 1 proximity 
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Afars 1975 0 no shared traits 
Afars 1976 0 no shared traits 
Afars 1977 0 no shared traits 
Afars 1978 0 no shared traits 
Afars 1979 0 no shared traits 
Afars 1980 0 no shared traits 
Afars 1981 0 no shared traits 
Afars 1982 0 no shared traits 
Afars 1983 0 no shared traits 
Afars 1984 0 no shared traits 
Afars 1985 0 no shared traits 
Afars 1986 0 no shared traits 
Afars 1987 0 no shared traits 
Afars 1988 0 no shared traits 
Afars 1989 0 no shared traits 
Afars 1990 0 no shared traits 
Afars 1991 0 no shared traits 
Afars 1992 0 no shared traits 
Eritreans  1950 1 homelands 
Eritreans  1951 1 homelands 
Eritreans  1952 1 homelands 
Eritreans  1953 1 homelands 
Eritreans  1954 1 homelands 
Eritreans  1955 1 homelands 
Eritreans  1956 1 homelands 
Eritreans  1957 1 homelands 
Eritreans  1958 1 homelands 
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Eritreans 1959 1 homelands 
Eritreans 1960 1 homelands 
Eritreans 1961 1 homelands 
Eritreans 1962 1 homelands 
Eritreans 1963 1 homelands 
Eritreans 1964 1 homelands 
Eritreans 1965 1 homelands 
Eritreans 1966 1 homelands 
Eritreans 1967 1 homelands 
Eritreans 1968 1 homelands 
Eritreans 1969 1 homelands 
Eritreans 1970 1 homelands 
Eritreans 1971 1 homelands 
Eritreans 1972 1 homelands 
Eritreans 1973 1 homelands 
Eritreans 1974 1 homelands 
Eritreans 1975 1 homelands 
Eritreans 1976 1 homelands 
Eritreans 1977 1 homelands 
Eritreans 1978 1 homelands 
Eritreans 1979 1 homelands 
Eritreans 1980 1 homelands 
Eritreans 1981 1 homelands 
Eritreans 1982 1 homelands 
Eritreans 1983 1 homelands 
Eritreans 1984 1 homelands 
Eritreans 1985 1 homelands 
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Eritreans  1986 1 homelands 
Eritreans  1987 1 homelands 
Eritreans  1988 1 homelands 
Eritreans  1989 1 homelands 
Eritreans  1990 1 homelands 
Eritreans  1991 1 homelands 
Eritreans  1992 1 homelands 
Oromo     1950 1 proximity 
Oromo     1951 1 proximity 
Oromo     1952 1 proximity 
Oromo     1953 1 proximity 
Oromo     1954 1 proximity 
Oromo     1955 1 proximity 
Oromo     1956 1 proximity 
Oromo     1957 1 proximity 
Oromo     1958 1 proximity 
Oromo     1959 1 proximity 
Oromo     1960 1 proximity 
Oromo     1961 1 proximity 
Oromo     1962 1 proximity 
Oromo     1963 1 proximity 
Oromo     1964 1 proximity 
Oromo     1965 1 proximity 
Oromo     1966 1 proximity 
Oromo     1967 1 proximity 
Oromo     1968 1 proximity 
Oromo     1969 2 proximity, religion 
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Oromo     1970 2 proximity, religion 
Oromo     1971 2 proximity, religion 
Oromo     1972 3 proximity, religion, language 
Oromo     1973 3 proximity, religion, language 
Oromo     1974 3 proximity, religion, language 
Oromo     1975 3 proximity, religion, language 
Oromo     1976 3 proximity, religion, language 
Oromo     1977 3 proximity, religion, language 
Oromo     1978 3 proximity, religion, language 
Oromo     1979 3 proximity, religion, language 
Oromo     1980 3 proximity, religion, language 
Oromo     1981 3 proximity, religion, language 
Oromo     1982 3 proximity, religion, language 
Oromo     1983 3 proximity, religion, language 
Oromo     1984 3 proximity, religion, language 
Oromo     1985 3 proximity, religion, language 
Oromo     1986 3 proximity, religion, language 
Oromo     1987 3 proximity, religion, language 
Oromo     1988 3 proximity, religion, language 
Oromo     1989 3 proximity, religion, language 
Oromo     1990 3 proximity, religion, language 
Oromo     1991 3 proximity, religion, language 
Oromo     1992 3 proximity, religion, language 
Somalis    1950 0 no shared traits 
Somalis    1951 0 no shared traits 
Somalis    1952 0 no shared traits 
Somalis    1953 0 no shared traits 
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Somalis          1954 0 no shared traits 
Somalis 1955 0 no shared traits 
Somalis 1956 0 no shared traits 
Somalis 1957 0 no shared traits 
Somalis 1958 0 no shared traits 
Somalis 1959 0 no shared traits 
Somalis 1960 0 no shared traits 
Somalis 1961 0 no shared traits 
Somalis 1962 0 no shared traits 
Somalis 1963 0 no shared traits 
Somalis 1964 0 no shared traits 
Somalis 1965 0 no shared traits 
Somalis 1966 0 no shared traits 
Somalis 1967 0 no shared traits 
Somalis 1968 0 no shared traits 
Somalis 1969 0 no shared traits 
Somalis 1970 0 no shared traits 
Somalis 1971 0 no shared traits 
Somalis 1972 0 no shared traits 
Somalis 1973 0 no shared traits 
Somalis 1974 0 no shared traits 
Somalis 1975 0 no shared traits 
Somalis 1976 0 no shared traits 
Somalis 1977 0 no shared traits 
Somalis 1978 0 no shared traits 
Somalis 1979 1 proximity 
Somalis 1980 1 proximity 
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Somalis 1981 1 proximity 
Somalis 1982 1 proximity 
Somalis 1983 1 proximity 
Somalis 1984 1 proximity 
Somalis 1985 1 proximity 
Somalis 1986 1 proximity 
Somalis 1987 1 proximity 
Somalis 1988 1 proximity 
Somalis 1989 1 proximity 
Somalis 1990 1 proximity 
Somalis 1991 1 proximity 
Somalis 1992 1 proximity 
Tigreans 1950 4 all traits shared 
Tigreans 1951 4 all traits shared 
Tigreans 1952 4 all traits shared 
Tigreans 1953 4 all traits shared 
Tigreans 1954 4 all traits shared 
Tigreans 1955 4 all traits shared 
Tigreans 1956 4 all traits shared 
Tigreans 1957 4 all traits shared 
Tigreans 1958 4 all traits shared 
Tigreans 1959 4 all traits shared 
Tigreans 1960 4 all traits shared 
Tigreans 1961 4 all traits shared 
Tigreans 1962 4 all traits shared 
Tigreans 1963 4 all traits shared 
Tigreans 1964 4 all traits shared 
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Tigreans 1965 4 all traits shared 
Tigreans 1966 4 all traits shared 
Tigreans 1967 4 all traits shared 
Tigreans 1968 4 all traits shared 
Tigreans 1969 4 all traits shared 
Tigreans 1970 3 proximity, homelands, religion 
Tigreans 1971 3 proximity, homelands, religion 
Tigreans 1972 3 proximity, homelands, religion 
Tigreans 1973 3 proximity, homelands, religion 
Tigreans 1974 2 proximity, homelands 
Tigreans 1975 2 proximity, homelands 
Tigreans 1976 2 proximity, homelands 
Tigreans 1977 2 proximity, homelands 
Tigreans 1978 2 proximity, homelands 
Tigreans 1979 2 proximity, homelands 
Tigreans 1980 2 proximity, homelands 
Tigreans 1981 2 proximity, homelands 
Tigreans 1982 2 proximity, homelands 
Tigreans 1983 2 proximity, homelands 
Tigreans 1984 2 proximity, homelands 
Tigreans 1985 2 proximity, homelands 
Tigreans 1986 2 proximity, homelands 
Tigreans 1987 2 proximity, homelands 
Tigreans 1988 2 proximity, homelands 
Tigreans 1989 2 proximity, homelands 
Tigreans 1990 2 proximity, homelands 
Tigreans 1991 2 proximity, homelands 
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Tigreans 1992 2 proximity, homelands 
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